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Introduction 
By their widely different approaches to 
the crisis, the two Scandinavian neighbors 
Denmark and Sweden represent the sharp 
division among the European countries on the 
migrant crisis. It is a line between those which, 
like Sweden, have said “come to our country” – 
thereby encouraging the flood of newcomers on 
EU ground - and those skeptical, like Denmark, 
of the ability of their societies to absorb such a 
huge influx of asylum seekers from vastly 
different cultural and religious backgrounds.  
No doubt the massive flows of 
newcomers – some refugees, many others 
migrants0F 1    - have had and will have a major 
impact for years and probably decades to come, 
with long-lasting consequences for the safety, 
security, and stability of Europe.1F2  
The terror attacks that tore apart an 
airport and a metro stop in Brussels right before 
Easter, 2016 and killed more than 30 and hurt 
hundreds more – and undertaken by terrorists 
taking refuge in the avalanche of newcomers - 
made the magnitude of the challenges that Europe 
is now confronting painfully clear. Only a few 
weeks before the Brussels attacks, and four 
months after the ones in Paris, the U.S Secretary 
of State, John Kerry had talked at the Munich 
Conference and said “The United States of 
America understands the near existential nature 
of this threat to the politics and fabric of life in 
Europe – and that is why we are joining now in 
enforcing a NATO mission to close off a key 
access route, and that is why we will join with you 
in other ways to stem this tide (of migrants) 
because of the potential of its damage to the fabric 
of a united Europe.”  This, the Secretary noted, 
poses “unprecedented challenges” to Europe.  
This report analyzes the migrant crisis 
which in 2015 tormented, and in 2016 continues 
to torment, Europe: what happened and why, and 
most importantly, the implications of the crisis 
for Europe and the EU, with a special focus on 
Sweden and Denmark.  In all other ways, these 
two neighboring Scandinavian countries come 
across to the outside world as almost identical, 
but thus represent opposite positions with regard 
to the migration and refugee issue. In short, how 
did Europe end up in this chaos, and what will be 
the implications on security, for Sweden, 
Denmark and the rest of Europe?  
Two Countries, a Bridge Apart 
”Refugee? Welcome to Sweden!” 
That cheerful message greeted those 
arriving last fall to the Central Station in Malmö, 
the third largest city of Sweden where the trains 
from Copenhagen, Denmark arrive after crossing 
the 5-mile Øresund Bridge which connects the 
two neighboring countries.2F3  Bright green arrows 
painted on the floor and the walls marked the way 
to the nearest refugee center from every corner of 
the train station. Similar arrangements were made 
in other cities to facilitate the arrival of the 
asylum seekers, every day entering Sweden by 
the thousands at that point.   
As one of the countries with the most 
generous refugee policy, Sweden was, jointly 
with Germany, the destination of many of the 
newcomers who made the headline news around 
the world ever since the dramatic months in the 
fall of 2015 when the external and internal 
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borders one after the other collapsed in Europe. 
Once inside the EU, the asylum seekers, crossing 
the European continent by foot, train and 
sometimes by car, were for all practical purposes 
free to set out for whatever country seemed most 
welcoming. To a large number of them, that 
country was either Germany or Sweden.  
Then suddenly one day in late 
November, all signs and arrows were removed, 
literally overnight as the Swedish government 
abruptly reversed its hitherto welcoming stance to 
introduce a new and restrictive policy.3F 4   In 
addition, Swedish police started to board all trains 
arriving from abroad to check passengers´ 
passports or national id´s. On January 4, 2016, 
when carrier´s liability was introduced by the 
Swedish government, an additional control was 
set up already on Danish territory at Kastrup 
international airport (the main international 
airport for all of Southern Scandinavia), while 
another control greeted passengers about to 
embark on the ferries that sail every 20 minutes 
between the twin cities, Helsingør (or Elsinore) 
on the Danish side and Helsingborg in Sweden. 
A number of tough new restrictions were 
announced as the government moved to pull the 
breaks on the steady flow of newcomers to 
Swedish territory, at that point peaking at around 
1500 to 2000 a day.  Only temporary resident 
permits would be granted for the next three years, 
replacing the permanent ones that had previously 
been given all Syrian refugees; stricter 
regulations were introduced for bringing in 
family members, and much more.4F5  
For the residents of the Öresund region, 
where the two countries merge to form one single 
region and market for living and working, daily 
life became suddenly much more complicated at 
the end of 2015. The residents of the Nordic 
countries have benefitted from the Nordic 
Passport Union since 1954, allowing them to 
travel and reside in the five countries without any 
need to carry national identification cards.5F6  The 
Nordic Passport Union thus preceded with almost 
half a century the Schengen agreement of 2001 
which extended the same rights to all EU citizens. 
The closing of the hitherto open Swedish borders 
from one day to the next, and the reluctant though 
determined reversal of the country´s policy on the 
migrant issue, serve to illustrate the dramatic 
events that marked 2015, with the greatest 
refugee and migrant crisis in Europe since World 
War II. The decision by the government of 
Sweden – a country with a predilection for 
describing itself as a “humanitarian superpower” 
- was quickly followed by Denmark, where
thousands of migrants would otherwise have been
stranded as they made their way towards Sweden.
The approach to the historic crisis by the two
neighbors on opposite sides of the Strait could,
however, hardly have been more different.  The
government of Sweden has, jointly with equally
generous Germany, departed from a moralist
stand and an “open hearts” policy, as it has been
referred to ever since the former Prime Minister,
Fredrik Reinfeldt coined the phrase in a speech in
the summer of 2014 in which he urged the
Swedes to “open their hearts” to welcome the
new wave of asylum seekers which he and his
government expected in the months and years to
come.6F7
Across the narrow strait of Öresund, 
Denmark has been widely criticized for a much 
harsher – or more realistic, some would say - 
attitude, with yet another round of new anti-
immigration legislation in early 2016, including a 
controversial (and much misinterpreted) proposal 
to have newcomers hand over cash and valuables 
on arrival to the Danish authorities to contribute 
to the costs of housing and living. Denmark´s 
positions on the migrant crisis are governed by its 
opt-out on EU judicial affairs (“EU justice and 
home affairs”), including asylum issues, which 
was reinforced in the referendum in December, 
2015. Denmark is amongst the signatories to the 
Dublin Regulation, but because of its opt-out has 
not participated in the (failed) EU plan to resettle 
160.000 refugees.    
The fact that Sweden was the first of the 
two countries to close its borders is in this sense 
ironic, though as we have seen, this step was 
taken very reluctantly and at only a very late 
stage, at a point when the Swedish authorities 
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realized that they were about to lose control of 
both the situation and Swedish territory as a result 
of the massive inflow of newcomers. The 
decision by Denmark to shut down its own border 
to Germany was thus determined by a desire to 
avoid getting stuck with the thousands of asylum 
seekers on their way towards Sweden. The deep 
disagreements between Stockholm and 
Copenhagen on how to handle the dramatic surge 
of asylum seekers sent relations between the two 
otherwise close and friendly neighbors to an 
exceptional, all-time low at the end of 2015. 
That year, a grand total of 163,000 newcomers 
applied for asylum in Sweden, a country with a 
population of approximately 10 million; in 
addition, an unknown number had escaped 
registration. Up to 80,000 of these applications 
would be rejected for not meeting the criteria for 
asylum, Swedish authorities announced in early 
2016.7F8    Many Swedes are however skeptical of 
the authorities´ ability to actually deport that 
many from the country´s territory, considering 
the meager success so far in ousting illegal 
migrants.  
The number of asylum seekers made a 
sharp turn downwards right after the introduction 
of the new border controls. But in spite of these, 
estimates of a continued influx to Sweden in 2016 
ranged from 40,000 to 70,000 and even the 
double.8F9  Denmark – with half the population of 
Sweden, and geographically a much smaller 
territory - received approximately 21,000 asylum 
seekers in 2015; the lowest increase among the 
Northern European countries since 2014, 
according to a study by Eurostat. The 
significantly lower number was seen by the 
Danish government as proof of the efficiency of 
its efforts to discourage migrants from picking 
Denmark as their destination.9F10   
The European Migrant Crisis 
Asylum seekers from Syria and 
elsewhere had been arriving on European ground 
already for years when the number of newcomers 
trying to reach the continent exploded in the late 
summer and fall of 2015. As the external EU-
borders collapsed in Italy and – with even graver 
consequence for the Union – in Greece, refugees 
and migrants started to pour into the Union by the 
thousands.  
European populations and governments 
watched with disbelief as a seemingly endless 
stream of people moved, often by foot, from one 
country to the next on their way north. The 
Dublin Regulation that stipulates that 
applications for asylum in the EU should be 
processed in the first Schengen country of arrival 
was quickly thrown aside as Greek authorities 
proved either unable or unwilling – or both – to 
register all those arriving to the archipelago from 
Turkey and elsewhere.  
With their minds and hearts set on 
reaching the two countries most hospitable to 
refugees – Germany and Sweden – thousands of 
people determinedly trudged through the Balkans 
and onwards, swiftly shifting routes as borders 
closed and leaving a trail of neighborly 
disagreements within the EU behind. Although 
the stream of asylum seekers crossing the 
Continent was often described by the media as 
refugees from the Syrian civil war, many were 
thus economic migrants trying – with mixed 
results – to melt in with the refugees and pose as 
Syrians, thereby hoping to be granted asylum.  
Only a third of the asylum seekers were 
estimated to be actually Syrian, while the rest had 
made it to Europe from other destinations, 
primarily Afghanistan and Iraq but also from as 
far away as Eritrea, Pakistan and Iran.10F11  Many 
were young boys under – or claiming to be under 
– the age of 18. As “anchor babies,” the role of
the unaccompanied minors was – and is – to get
asylum in the EU, and thereby the right to bring
their families along at a later stage (a right which
however was restricted in Sweden at the end of
2016).
More often than not, the newcomers had 
paid a steep prize in cash to the rapidly growing 
industry of ruthless smugglers who profit on the 
human tragedies. Not all made the hazardous 
journey in rickety boats from the Turkish coast to 
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the Greek islands, or the dangerous crossing of 
the Mediterranean from the African coast where 
Libya´s collapse into a failed state provide fertile 
ground for smugglers and terrorists. The photo of 
the dead body of three-year-old Alan Kurdi 
washed ashore on a Turkish beach moved 
compassion for the Syrian plight to new heights 
among Europeans and marked a virtual game 
changer in the debate. 
In Germany, a total of one million people 
had applied for asylum by the end of 2015. The 
decision by the German chancellor, Angela 
Merkel, in early September, 2015 to set aside the 
Dublin Regulation and open her countries´ 
borders to the tens of thousands stranded in 
Hungary, who arrived through Austria while 
chanting “Germany, Germany, Germany” - a first 
for the Chancellor´s country given its troubled 
historic past – dramatically escalated the crisis. 
More than 20,000 asylum-seekers arrived in 
Germany only the weekend after Merkel´s 
decision.11F12   “Wir schaffen das” – we´ll handle it 
– said a confident Chancellor. Many of her
colleagues at home and in the EU were far from
certain.
In 2015, the 28 EU countries split, 
roughly speaking, into three groups with regards 
to the migrant crisis: the countries of first arrival 
– primarily Greece and Italy – followed by the
transit countries, which one after the other
proceeded to close their borders as the trail of
migrants moved north, and finally, countries that
(also after the restrictions) were the favored
destinations for the migrants, thus primarily
Germany and Sweden.
Towards the end of the Union? 
With thousands and thousands crossing 
the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea to illegally 
enter the Continent, Europe and the EU were 
thrown into chaos, crisis and disarray. As 
divisions deepened by the month – or even week 
or day - inside the EU, the long term 
consequences of the migrant crisis dawned on 
observers, with many questioning the ability of 
the Union to actually survive this crisis of historic 
proportions. The Dutch EU presidency that took 
over in the spring of 2016 quickly made the 
migrant crisis its number one priority.  
 “For the EU, migration is thus likely to 
become the ultimate make-or-break issue”, 
concludes a report from Carnegie Europe in early 
2016.12F 13    Others agreed, arguing that the EU 
could be rapidly moving towards a collapse as the 
result of several factors, prior amongst them the 
scenario of a Brexit and the migrant crisis.13F14  The 
negative outcome in early April, 2016 of the 
Dutch referendum on the EU agreement with the 
Ukraine provided yet another example of the 
mounting skepticism of the European population 
towards the EU.  
As key elements of EU regulations were 
disregarded with first the collapse of the Union´s 
external borders, followed by a wave of closings 
of national borders, and the Union and its member 
states seemed unable to agree on ways to handle 
the crisis, the odds seemed indeed to work in 
favor of such somber conclusions in early 2016.  
At that point a number of unsuccessful attempts 
had been made to rescue the Schengen agreement 
– and in the longer perspective, the EU – and to
reinforce the Union´s external borders by
providing new resources to the Union´s border
units, Frontex. These efforts were inspired by the
Italian Mare Nostrum operation in 2013-2014
which had successfully reduced the number of
migrants to primarily Sicily and the number of
casualties on the Mediterranean.14F 15   But
negotiations were slow, as Greece, though clearly
unable to handle it themselves, refused to let other
countries to take over the patrol of its borders. In
early February, 2016, NATO was asked, and
subsequently quickly agreed, to deploy one of its
Standing Maritime Groups to monitor the flows
of migrants in order to deter illegal human
trafficking in the Eastern Aegean Sea.15F16
A parallel line of negotiations was aimed 
at getting Turkey to stop the flow of refugees 
from pouring out of the camps and over to the 
Greek islands. Also that model was to some 
extent inspired by Italy, and the deal that then-
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi signed with 
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Libya´s Colonel Gadaffi in 2008, offering a 
generous trade deal in return for a reduction in the 
flow of migrants (though officially the deal  was 
to compensate for Italy´s colonial rule over Libya 
in the past).16F17   
The external borders of the Union 
however remained porous, and one EU country 
after the other closed down borders, or limited 
access to their territory. An unprecedented step 
was taken by Austria, one of the countries that 
had accepted a heavy burden in the crisis, when it 
invited a group of Balkan countries to a summit 
in Vienna in early 2016 in an effort to shut the 
migrant route passing through their countries.17F18  
When non-EU country Macedonia closed its 
border, tens of thousands of migrants got stuck 
south of the border in the Idomeni camp in 
Greece, from which groups of migrants 
repeatedly tried to force their way north.  
The EU had also agreed on a quota 
system in the fall of 2015. But the idea of 
relocating asylum seekers more evenly among the 
28 EU countries quickly proved inadequate, as 
countries in particular in Central and Eastern 
Europe, with limited prior experience of 
immigration, resisted calls to accept the 
newcomers.  As of February, 2016 fewer than 500 
migrants were reported to have found new homes 
in the EU as a result of the quota system.18F19   
Clearly, a solution had to focus on 
stopping the flow of migrants from leaving the 
camps in Turkey, where they had often lived for 
years, to cross the Aegean Sea. After lengthy 
negotiations, with a gradually higher price tag 
delivered from Ankara, an agreement was finally 
reached in March, 2016 between the EU and 
Turkey, with a “one-for one” policy at its core. 
According to this deal, all asylum seekers who 
arrived to Greece by sea would be returned to 
Turkey, and in return, the EU agreed to accept 
one Syrian refugee already in the Turkish camps 
for everyone who was sent back. Those returned, 
and those who tried to enter the EU illegally after 
the deal was in effect, were to be dispatched to 
the very end of the line for future European 
resettlement.  
Several incentives were offered by the 
EU for Turkey to agree to this deal: not only 
would Ankara receive financial assistance in the 
amount of several billions from the EU, the EU 
also promised to ease the visa requirements for 
Turkish citizens travelling to the EU and to open 
new chapters in the negotiations on EU 
membership for Turkey. In addition, discussions 
on a reform of the Dublin Regulation were 
initiated in Brussels, with a number of alternative 
methods for dispersing asylum seekers among the 
member countries presented by the Commission.  
The first ships with deported refugees on board 
departed from the Greek islands to the Turkish 
shore in the first week of April. The message was 
clear to those contemplating a journey in the 
reverse direction: don´t do it, and if you still do it, 
you will be sent back to Turkey and your hopes 
for a future in the EU would vanish for years or 
more. But human smugglers were reported to 
quickly have found other ways to get migrants 
into the Union, by exploring new routes through 
Bulgaria and Albania and reopening the Italian 
route, which had actually never really closed. 
According to the Italian authorities, more than 
153,000 migrants arrived by sea to Italy in 2015, 
and warnings were issued that 800,000 migrants 
or more were preparing to depart from camps in 
Libya in the spring of 2016.   
Apart from various Mediterranean 
routes, migrants and their smugglers had also 
discovered an alternative – and somewhat 
unexpected - route leading to the wealthy Nordic 
countries through Russia, whose involvement in 
the migrant crisis became increasingly clear in 
the first months of 2016.19F20   
Importing terrorism 
The “near existential threat” that US 
Secretary of State John Kerry had referred to in 
his speech at the 2016 Munich Conference once 
again became painfully real when yet another 
terrorist attack occurred on European soil right 
before Easter. This time Islamist terror hit 
Brussels, where bombs exploded in the morning 
of March 22, first at the airport and shortly 
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afterwards in the metro, killing more than 30 and 
hurting hundreds more.   
The Brussels bombs came only four 
months after the devastating attacks that took 
place simultaneously in several different parts of 
Paris in November. It was soon clear that the two 
were related, with a number of terrorists involved 
in both and planned by interconnected cells. It 
was also revealed that the Brussels attack had 
originally been planned as a second attack in 
Paris.  The Washington Post concludes in an 
article in April, 2016, that “over the past six 
months, more than three dozen suspected 
militants who impersonated migrants have been 
arrested or died while planning or carrying out 
acts of terrorism. They include at least seven 
directly tied to the bloody attacks in Paris and 
Brussels.”20F21  
A link to Sweden quickly emerged in the 
investigations. One of the jihadists who were shot 
by the Belgian security forces right before the 
Brussels attack had lived in Sweden until two 
years ago, when he had joined the Islamic State. 
In addition, one of the two terrorists involved in 
the metro attack – the one who had left without 
setting off the bombs he was carrying - was a 
Swedish man, Osama Krayem, who was born and 
raised in Malmö and who had returned to Europe 
with the refugee trail using a fake passport with 
the name Naim Al Hamed after a stint to receive 
training in Syria.21F22  Osama Krayem was caught 
and arrested after an intense manhunt. The 
investigation following his arrest quickly 
discovered that he had also been involved in the 
Paris attacks. 
That Swedes were among the architects 
of the terrorist attacks in 2015 and early 2016 did 
not surprise experts, since Sweden is one of the 
EU countries with the highest number of IS 
recruits, after Belgium and Austria.22F 23   As of 
January 2015 – that is, before the flow of 
migrants escalated into a major European crisis – 
the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO) estimated 
that 130 persons with Swedish passports had 
joined the IS, plus an additional 100-150 or more 
who have not been accounted for. At least 80 
jihadist fighters had returned to Sweden.23F24   The 
Danish Security Police (PET) reports a total of at 
least 125 Danish citizens to have left for Syria as 
of spring 2016, of whom 27 have been killed and 
60 had returned to Denmark.24F25    
In April, 2016, Swedish press reported – 
and the Security Police confirmed - that the Iraqi 
security service had warned their Swedish 
colleagues that 7 or 8 IS terrorists had entered 
Sweden to launch an attack in Stockholm, right at 
the time when several big events where taking 
place in the capital, including the celebration of 
the King´s 70th birthday and the Eurovision Song 
Contest. The Iraqis also alerted Swedish and 
other authorities that IS terrorists could hide in 
the refugee trail to Europe.25F 26   Generally 
speaking, the risk for an attack is however not 
considered quite as high in Sweden as for other 
countries that are actively participating in the 
fight against IS, such as Denmark.26F27   
Both countries have experienced terrorist 
attacks at home; in Copenhagen, twice in one day 
on Valentine´s Day, February 14, 2015 when a 
radicalized Muslim first attacked a café where a 
public meeting was taking place, killing one in 
the audience, and later the city synagogue, where 
the unarmed man who was guarding the gate 
while a Bat-Mitzwa party was going on inside 
was killed. In addition, there have been a number 
of aborted attacks in Denmark following the 
cartoon crisis in 2006. In Sweden, a failed attack 
that could have killed hundreds of Christmas 
shoppers in the center of Stockholm killed only 
the suicide bomber himself in December, 2008. 
In spite of these multiple warning 
signals, Denmark is reportedly the only country 
to have followed up on the names of jihadists 
listed in the 22,000 documents that were leaked 
from the Islamic State in early 2016, with nine 
arrests in one single weekend in Copenhagen in 
April. Sweden, Belgium, Holland, France and 
United Kingdom had at that point reportedly not 
yet made any arrests as a result of the information 
in the leaked documents.27F28   
6 
A Continent in Chaos: The Security Implications of the European Migrant Crisis 
Terrorist expert Magnus Ranstorp – 
himself a Swede living in Copenhagen – is not 
surprised by the high number of jihadists 
departing from Sweden, or that Swedes 
participated in the European attacks. According 
to Ranstorp, Sweden has long avoided 
confronting the issue of European terrorism. “The 
country has been a perfect hiding place”, he says, 
while pointing also to the limited debate on the 
dangers of Islamist terror, and the lack of political 
initiatives to prevent radicalization. Until quite 
recently it was, for instance, not illegal to join a 
terrorist organization or to sign up as an IS 
terrorist.28F29   
The risk of importing terrorism through 
the migrant flows was initially rejected in 
Denmark. A statement by the head of the Danish 
Defense Intelligence Service (FE) only a week 
before the Paris attacks, claiming that it was 
unlikely for terrorists to use the migrant trail to 
get into Europe has been strongly criticized, as 
have similar declarations by representatives of 
the Security Police.29F 30  It was quite simply too 
complicated a route to take for the jihadists, who 
would be able to make it to Europe anyway, they 
argued.   
There have however been many signs 
that the migrant chaos has been used by the IS to 
reenter terrorists into Europe after training in 
Syria. Osama Krayem, who as we have seen was 
involved in both the Paris and Brussels attacks, 
first arrived with the refugee trail and a fake 
Syrian passport to the Greek island of Leros – the 
island preferred by the terrorists, since the EU 
border agency, Frontex, did not have much of a 
presence there.30F31  From there he continued to a 
refugee camp in German Ulm which he left 
shortly afterwards when his terrorist colleague 
from Paris, Salah Abdeslam (who was arrested by 
Belgian police prior to the attacks in Brussels) 
came to pick him up.31F32   
Contrary to the analysis by the Danish 
intelligence service and others, the terrorists had 
plenty of reasons for taking cover in the migrant 
trail through Europe with fake Syrian passports in 
their pockets. The Islamic State often confiscates 
the recruits´ original passports, and in addition, 
the terrorists may obviously prefer not to use their 
real identity for fear of being discovered by the 
authorities.32F 33   General Philip Breedlove, 
Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, remarked 
at a U.S Senate hearing in early March, 2016, that 
the stream of refugees into Europe was “masking 
the movements of criminals, terrorists and 
foreign fighters”, with ISIS “spreading like a 
cancer taking advantage of paths of least 
resistance, threatening European nations and our 
own with terrorist attacks”.33F34    
King Abdullah of Jordan went even 
further than that in a blunt statement made during 
an interview with The Guardian in late March, 
2016, in which he argued that President Erdogan 
of Turkey was sending dangerous and violent 
radical Islamists to Europe mixed in with the 
flows of migrants.34F 35  Concerns have also been 
voiced that the removal by the EU of the visa 
requirement for Turkish citizens, which is a key 
part of the EU-Turkey deal, will increase the risk 
of terrorists entering the Continent. 
Russia and the Migrant Crisis 
Six months after launching the air 
campaign in Syria, Vladimir Putin officially 
announced that Russia was withdrawing, though 
Russian ships remained in the naval base which 
his country keeps in Syria, and fighter jets were 
supposedly on stand-by to make a quick return if 
needed. Though the purpose of the Russian 
military campaign was officially presented as the 
same as that of the Western coalition - to stop the 
IS advance in Syria - it did not take long for the 
world to realize that Russia´s real objective was 
to support President Assad and eliminate the 
moderate opposition that was fighting the 
government forces.  
By the ruthless bombing of civilian 
targets inside Syria, and a particularly brutal 
assault on the city of Aleppo – which was the 
stronghold of the opposition - Putin also achieved 
another major goal with the campaign: to trigger 
a new wave of Syrian refugees towards Turkey 
and onwards to Europe, and thereby to further 
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destabilize and weaken the EU and the West. 
Putin´s real objectives thus seem to have gone far 
beyond the Syrian ground. The military 
assistance to Assad was part of a grand strategy 
to establish Russia as a major power in the Middle 
East and to challenge the West and the entire 
international system, in a similar fashion as with 
the illegal annexation of Crimea two years earlier. 
As U.S Senator John McCain phrased it 
at the 2016 Munich Security Conference:  “… 
(H)e (Putin) wants to exacerbate the refugee
crisis and use it as a weapon to divide the
transatlantic alliance and undermine the
European project”.35F36  According to that analysis,
Putin thus expected a new heavy stream of
refugees from Syria pouring into Europe to
deepen the conflict between European countries
with different views on how to handle the crisis,
and to put the Schengen agreement and the entire
EU project into serious jeopardy.36F37  At his Senate
hearing, General Philip Breedlove used a similar
vocabulary as Senator McCain when he talked of
the “weaponisation of immigration” and stated
that he himself “couldn´t find any other reason for
them (air strikes against civilians) other than to
cause refugees to be on the move and make them
somebody else´s problem”.37F38
As thousands more refugees and 
migrants flowed into Europe, Putin was counting 
on the East European countries that were 
reluctant to accept huge numbers of asylum-
seekers from the South to become further isolated 
within the EU. As it happens, those very same 
countries also strongly reject any proposals by the 
EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and 
others for lifting the sanctions on Russia after 
Ukraine. Another massive flow of refugees into 
the Turkish camps opposite the Syrian border 
would also further exacerbate tensions between 
the EU and Turkey. As a NATO Ally, Turkey is 
also in a position to draw the Alliance into the 
scene, or alternatively demonstrate NATO´s 
weakness if it fails to provide support to Ankara. 
The NATO mission in the Aegean Sea was 
important from also this perspective, as a show of 
resolve and presence.  
Speculations on Moscow´s involvement, 
including of Russian financing of human 
smugglers, took a new turn when Syrian refugees 
started to show up in the very opposite part of 
Europe, on the Russian border to Norway and 
Finland. The opening of a new, Northern route for 
refugees and migrants to make it into Europe 
would thus provide Putin with yet another 
instrument for destabilizing the EU. The Defense 
Minister of Finland, Jussi Niinistö from the anti-
immigration party True Finns, warned that his 
country – which up until that point had accepted 
only a very limited number of newcomers - might 
be facing a wave of up to one million asylum 
seekers from Russia. “Illegal immigration 
through the Eastern border is without doubt our 
greatest challenge”, the Defense Minister stated, 
while also declaring this as part of Russian hybrid 
warfare.38F39     
However, there were also other, indirect 
but equally serious, consequences of the migrant 
crisis with regards to Russia. The arrival of huge 
numbers of newcomers to especially Sweden 
diverted resources, especially in the fall of 2015, 
when military personnel was assigned other 
tasks, such as the registration of asylum seekers 
or setting up tents for housing. By forcing 
countries under heavy pressure by the crisis to 
turn inwards to handle urgent domestic 
challenges with – in the Swedish case - hundreds 
of thousands of newcomers, there was also an 
obvious risk that the political and military focus 
is removed from the Baltic Sea, with an ongoing 
Russian aggression with simulated bombing 
attacks and submarine intrusions in the Nordic 
archipelagoes.39F40   
Clashes of Cultures in Europe 
One group has greatly benefitted from 
the migrant crisis, and from the profound 
demographic changes that Europe has 
experienced with increasing strength over the 
past few years: the nationalist anti-immigration 
parties. The success of the Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD) in the German state elections 
in March 2016 was a strong vote of protest 
against Chancellor Merkel´s open border 
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Willkommenskultur. The established old parties 
did poorly also in neighboring Austria, where 
Norbert Hofer from anti-immigration Die 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) triumphed 
in the first round of the presidential elections in 
April, though lost in the last round to the former 
leader of the Green party, Alexander Van der 
Bellen. For the first time since 1945, the second 
round was not a contest between candidates from 
the two old parties in Austrian politics, the 
Conservatives and Social Democrats. Following 
the devastating results of the elections, Werner 
Fay decided to resign as both Chancellor of 
Austria and leader of the Social Democrats in 
early May.  
In Denmark, the Danish People´s Party 
(Dansk Folkeparti, DF) have been a political 
force to reckon with for almost two decades, and 
is again back in the key position as the 
parliamentary “support party” to the minority 
government headed by Prime Minister Lars 
Løkke Rasmussen from the liberal (in a European 
sense) party Venstre. The elections to Parlament 
– Folketinget - in the summer of 2015 were a
great success for DF and its new party leader,
Kristian Thulesen Dahl, who brought the party
from 12.3 % in 2011 to a record high of 21.1 %
in 2015. Equally important is the “pull effect”
which DF exercises on Danish politics generally;
most significantly on the Social Democrats,
which in the election campaign in 2015 went to
great lengths to outdo DF in its anti-immigration
rhetoric. In addition, new far-right xenophobic
groups such as the Soldiers of Odin – a
phenomenon that originates from Finland – have
now started to appear also in Denmark.40F41
In Sweden, Sverigedemokraterna (The 
Sweden Democrats, SD) - with Nazi roots, which 
the DP does not have - have seen a steady rise in 
electoral support in the last few years. Since the 
election in 2014 SD is the third largest party in 
the Swedish parliament, with 12.8 % of the vote 
and up more than 7 % since the previous election 
in 2010. In addition, the numbers for SD kept 
going up in every opinion poll during the peak of 
the migrant crisis in the fall of 2015. The popular 
support for the SD coincides with studies that for 
the first time ever identify “immigration” as the 
number one political issue for the Swedish 
electorate, after 30 years when Swedes 
consistently rated “welfare” and “jobs” as their 
first priority.41F42   
The steady increase for the SD however 
came to a stop when the government pulled the 
brakes and closed the Swedish borders, and when 
the main opposition party, the center-right 
Moderate party, now headed by Anna Kinberg 
Batra, made a sharp u turn from the previous 
open-hearts policy represented by her 
predecessor as leader of the party, the former PM 
Fredrik Reinfeldt. Opinion polls registered the 
Moderates as again the largest party in Swedish 
politics in early 2016.42F43   The electoral pattern in 
those parts of Europe which have carried the 
heaviest burden in the crisis suggests that 
Europeans are now “tired of the refugee 
problem”, as phrased by a Danish newspaper.43F44   
It has moved from being a humanitarian issue to 
the day-to-day level, with the electorate 
expressing concerns that the enormous costs for 
receiving such large numbers of newcomers will 
drain the welfare state.  
On top of that, the attacks by large groups 
of young male asylum seekers and migrants on 
New Year´s Eve in Cologne and Stockholm, but 
also in small towns like Swedish Kalmar, and 
reports of harassment of young girls in public 
swimming pools and elsewhere, have raised the 
issue of whether Europe is heading into a historic 
clash of cultures as a result of immigration on 
such a large scale by people by people from 
widely different cultural backgrounds. Not only 
does migration affect demographics, but also the 
gender balance, with young men making up for 
73 % of the asylum applicants in 2015 and early 
2016. Sweden in particular is reported to be 
facing a “man problem”, with an unbalanced ratio 
between men and women.44F45   
The increase in popularity for the anti-
immigration parties thus reflects a growing 
inward-looking tendency among the European 
electorate. Some of the parties, especially in 
Eastern Europe, have their roots in the Fascist 
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parties of the 1930s. In addition, several – though 
far from all – of these parties combine a strong 
sense of nationalism not only with anti-
Americanism, anti-EU, and anti-NATO, but also 
with a positive view of Russia and Putin, 
including a readiness expressed by for instance 
French Marine Le Pen – who is a candidate in the 
presidential elections in 2017 - to stop the 
sanctions imposed by the EU after the Russian 
aggression in Ukraine and the illegal annexation 
of Crimea.   
 Conclusion.  From Migration to Security 
A Carnegie report on the migrant crisis 
concludes: “…Europe will undergo profound 
changes. So much is certain. But whether this 
process proceeds in a managed fashion with due 
regard to the interests both of the newcomers and 
of the current European population or takes place 
chaotically and disrupts Europe´s political and 
societal structures, this is clearly one of the most 
crucial questions for the future of the 
continent”.45F46 
That is indeed true; but the migrant crisis 
is so much more than solely a European problem. 
The massive flows of asylum seekers on 
European ground long ago stopped to be just a 
matter of migration, albeit on a much larger scale 
than ever before in modern times. What 
originated as a refugee or migration problem 
quickly evolved into one of security. 
The consequences of the migrant crisis 
range, as has been discussed on previous pages, 
from Europe now being targeted by the Islamic 
State and other extremist, jihadist organizations; 
to the division of Europe, with a patchwork of 
new, intra-European conflicts and the possible 
collapse of the Schengen agreement or even the 
European Union itself; to increased electoral 
support for xenophobic, nationalist parties in 
Europe, and clashes of cultures as numerous new 
populations from the Middle East settle in liberal 
and open democracies. With the Russian 
bombings in Syria, it became clear that yet 
another factor could be added to an already 
complex picture, pushing the crisis to a 
geostrategic level.  
The migrant crisis has thus assumed an 
international dimension with potentially far-
reaching strategic consequences. In the course of 
ten or eleven months, the European continent 
developed into something of a battle ground for 
external forces emerging from both the South – 
ISIL, which exploits the migrant chaos to spread 
jihadist terror – and the East – Russia, whose 
military intervention in the Syrian civil war 
resulted in additional migrant waves and further 
increased the political division and 
destabilization of Europe. Through the migrant 
crisis, Putin may actually, though indirectly, be 
accomplishing the same objectives which 
characterized Soviet foreign policy; to neutralize 
Europe, break up NATO, and weaken liberal 
democracies across Western Europe and make 
them more authoritarian.    
The crisis will have tangible 
consequences also for the US, though 
geographically removed from the scene. A 
weakened and divided Europe, and a non-
functioning EU, is bad news for the transatlantic 
community and the Western world per sei. The 
effect is even worse when it is combined with – 
and in part the result of – ISIL terror and another 
wave and form of Russian aggression. The 
Danish government made the interconnection 
between the various levels of the crisis clear with 
the decision to resume Denmark´s participation in 
the international air campaign in Syria in the 
spring of 2016. One of the objectives emphasized 
by Foreign Minister Kristian Jensen was to “stop 
the refugee stream that put Europe under so much 
pressure in 2015”. 46F47 
The transatlantic relationship will 
increasingly come under strain as the European 
allies are preoccupied with handling the 
consequences of the crisis on their societies, at the 
same time as the adversaries of the Western world 
are gaining strength. But the magnitude of the 
European crisis does not seem to always be fully 
understood in the US. President Obama has 
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announced that the US will take in 10,000 Syrian 
refugees; approximately the number that arrived 
in Sweden in less than a single week last fall. So 
far, the US has only received in the neighborhood 
of 3,000 refugees since 2011.47F48  
However, the US and the American 
President carry a heavy responsibility for the 
situation that Europe finds itself in today. The 
Syrian refugee and migrant crisis is to a 
significant extent the result of the dearth of 
American world leadership during the past eight 
years, and the US reluctance to provide support 
to the Syrian opposition fighting the Assad 
regime. President Obama´s red line that wasn’t in 
August 2012 was a strong and clear signal that the 
US would not intervene in the war; but when the 
US didn´t, others did. The rest is, as the 
saying goes, history – played out on European 
ground.
Copenhagen, June 2016. 
The views expressed in this report are those of the author, and do not 
necessarily reflect the positions of any of the institutions to which she is 
affiliated, the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, the Bush School of 
Government and Public Service, or Texas A&M University. 
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